tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8753953689256479588.post8525615095352090490..comments2023-08-21T06:15:31.248-04:00Comments on Philosophy Dad: EveryonePhilosophy Dadhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05375532935119092181noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8753953689256479588.post-57409141276757286412009-01-30T10:01:00.000-05:002009-01-30T10:01:00.000-05:00Interesting suggestion, Richard.So for an act to b...Interesting suggestion, Richard.<BR/><BR/>So for an act to be permissible, the consequences of everyone feeling free to do that act in our actual circumstances must not be terrible. <BR/><BR/>This seems too weak. Consider bizarre and difficult immoral acts that no one wants to do--I don’t know, something like filling the space shuttle with dolphins and releasing them into outer space. The consequences of everyone feeling free to do this, given our actual circumstances, would not be terrible, since, presumably, very few people want to do this, and among those, none have the capability to do so. Nonetheless, we'd still want to say of such an act that it is impermissible. <BR/><BR/>One reply would be to say that "oughtn't implies can." That is, morally condemning an act makes sense only when the act is possible (on some specification of "possible"). I don’t know whether "dolphins in space" is impossible in the relevant sense. But even if it were, I don't think we'd want to embrace "oughtn't implies can." It’s wrong for me to murder, even if I could never bring myself to do it. It’s wrong for me to steal, even if my clutziness always prevents me from advancing far in my plans to purloin. It would be wrong for me to nuke the whales (it is a bad hypothetical day for sea mammals--watch out walruses, you're next), even though I’ll never be in the possession of a nuclear weapon. And so on.<BR/><BR/>All this shows is that an act's passing your "feel free actual-world consequentialist universalization" (FFAWCU - ha ha) test isn't sufficient to tell us that the act is morally permissible. We might also ask whether an act's passing the FFAWCU is necessary to tell us that the act is morally permissible. <BR/><BR/>I don't know about this. If anything, FFAWCU seems superfluous, for it is unclear how it differs from a version of rule consequentialism (i.e., an act is right if it conforms with rules the having of which bring about the appropriate state of affairs). The answer may hinge on how we end up ranking the possible states of affairs.Philosophy Dadhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05375532935119092181noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8753953689256479588.post-51019235012762910452009-01-30T00:51:00.000-05:002009-01-30T00:51:00.000-05:00"For it’s unclear that universalization is even a ..."<I>For it’s unclear that universalization is even a necessary condition for the permissibility of an act.</I>"<BR/><BR/>It works if formulated more carefully, as the question "What if everyone <I>felt free</I> to do that?" It's fine for everyone to feel free to be professional philosophers (in our actual circumstances, at least), because most wouldn't want to anyway. Not so with littering, etc.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8753953689256479588.post-13340132304506623902009-01-07T12:30:00.000-05:002009-01-07T12:30:00.000-05:00Why not respond by telling them that "everyone els...Why not respond by telling them that "everyone else is doing it" is not a good argument. Explain it by picking something they do not like that everyone does does - like eat brussel spouts. "Do you think you should have to eat them just because everyone else does?" Try to turn their argument into a lesson about logic.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com